August 29, 2025

Information Cutoff: August 27, 2025

Authors: Matthew Sperzel, Daniel Shats, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, Alfred Han, and Karolina Hird of the Institute for the Study of War;

Yeji Chung and Luke Jacobus of the American Enterprise Institute

Editors: Dan Blumenthal, Nicholas Carl, and Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute

The second round of legislative recall votes in Taiwan failed on August 23 with a lower turnout and proportion of votes in favor compared to the July 26 recalls. None of the 31 elections had more votes in favor than against recalling their respective legislator – the highest proportion of yes votes was only 48.4% for Ye Yuan-chih. Only six elections met the threshold where 25 percent of the electorate must vote yes to recall the legislator. These votes failed by a significantly larger margin than the first round of votes in July 2025as average proportion of votes in favor of recall compared to the July 26 recall elections dropped 8.4 percent (from 42.2 percent to 33.8 percent) and average turnout dropped 6.9 percent (from 56.1 percent to 49.2 percent). The two rounds of votes highlight the failure of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to rally the public in order to remove legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). 

The DPP has undergone leadership changes amid these failures. Former Interior Minister Hsu Kuo-yung became the new DPP secretary general after his predecessor resigned on July 27. The DPP-controlled Executive Yuan (EY) will also undergo senior personnel changes in the coming days. President William Lai Ching-te has so far ignored calls to resign as DPP chairman, however. DPP legislative minority leader Ker Chien-ming—one of the leaders of the mass recall campaign—has likewise sought to retain his position.

The failed recall votes will likely politically strengthen the KMT, which has less incentive now to cooperate with the DPP. The Taiwanese public has demonstrated that it is unwilling to recall KMT legislators despite their obstruction of the DPP agenda and support for controversial legislation, including sweeping federal budget cuts. Taiwanese authorities are still investigating KMT officials on allegations of forging recall votes, however.

The Taiwanese EY approved the 2026 budget proposal on August 21. The budget would increase current defense spending from around 2.45 to 3.32 percent of GDP. The budget includes special funds for procurement, among other things, anti-tank missiles, artillery, attack drones, and surface-to-air missiles. President Lai expressed hope that Taiwan would spend around five percent of its GDP on the military by 2030. The budget has gone to the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan (LY) for approval. The KMT has expressed support for increases to military spending but could oppose elements of the budget. The KMT has, for example, criticized the budget for allotting insufficient funds to benefits for active and retired military personnel, arguing that it would harm recruitment and retention. The KMT previously cut military spending from around 2.45 to 2.08 percent of GDP amid sweeping federal budget cuts and freezes in January 2025. The KMT may feel emboldened to oppose DPP legislation since it survived the recall votes. The KMT may feel increasingly emboldened to oppose legislation since it survived the recall votes.

• Taiwan: The second round of legislative recall votes in Taiwan failed. This highlights the failure of the ruling DPP to rally the public in order to remove legislators from the opposition KMT. The failed recall votes will likely strengthen the KMT politically and reduce its incentive to cooperate with the DPP.

• Taiwan: The Lai Ching-te administration approved the 2026 budget proposal, which would increase military spending from around 2.08 to 3.32 percent of GDP. The budget included special funds for procuring artillery, attack drones, and other munitions. The budget has gone to the KMT-controlled legislature for approval.



• Korean Peninsula: South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has pushed for dialogue between the United States, South Korea, and North Korea, especially to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Senior North Korean officials have rejected his overtures. Lee separately announced that South Korea will increase its military spending.

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