May 23, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Adham Fattah, Ben Rezaei, Will Doran, Parker Hempel, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

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Iran’s latest counterproposal front-loads all of Iran’s key demands on the withdrawal of “a US threat to Iran,” financial relief, and Iran’s “right” to manage the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to delay discussion of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s proposal corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the regime believes it is winning the war and is negotiating from a position of strength. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) affiliated media outlet Tasnim News Agency reported on May 23 that Iran’s counterproposal was sent to Pakistani mediators. Iran demanded an end to the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of US forces from the ”warzone.” Withdrawing US “threats to Iran” would constitute a withdrawal from the region, presumably, which both removes US military leverage and accomplishes a key Iranian objective: expelling US forces from the region. The proposal included demands that Iran will not discuss its nuclear program unless the war first ends, rejects transferring its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile to the United States, and will not commit to dismantling its nuclear facilities, all of which are key US demands. The United States would be forfeiting considerable leverage in the first phase of an agreement before discussing the nuclear issue. The proposal also included Iranian demands that the United States lift all sanctions on Iran and release all frozen Iranian assets in the first phase. Iran emphasized in the proposal that the Strait of Hormuz will remain under some form of Iranian control and that Iran will not continue negotiations if the United States does not end its blockade of Iranian ports and ships. The maximalist terms in the proposal indicate that Iran’s regime believes it is negotiating from a position of strength due to its victory in the war.

Iranian officials continue to emphasize Iranian management of the Strait of Hormuz as a key sticking point in negotiations. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei stated on May 23 that the strait “does not concern” the United States and that Iran and Oman should define a mechanism for the waterway as coastal states. The New York Times reported on May 21 that Iran and Oman have discussed a system to charge vessels fees for maritime “services” rather than tolls for passage. This is illegal under international maritime law. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on May 23 that Iran has demanded that the strait not return to its pre-war mechanism and ”legal regime.” Tasnim added that Iran has demanded an end to the US naval blockade and said that negotiations will not proceed while the blockade remains in place. IRGC-affiliated Fars News separately reported that Iran will only commit to restoring the number of vessels that transit the strait to pre-war levels, while Iran would determine which vessels receive approval and what route they must take. The IRGC Navy reported on May 23 that 25 vessels crossed the strait in the past 24 hours after they received permission and transited under IRGC Navy coordination and security provision, which indicates that Iran is trying to portray itself as the manager and security provider for strait transit.

• Iran’s latest counterproposal frontloads all of Iran’s key demands on the withdrawal of “a US threat to Iran,” financial relief, and Iran’s “right” to manage the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to delay discussion of Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s proposal corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the regime believes it is winning the war and is negotiating from a position of strength.

• Iran’s latest proposal demanded an end to the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of US forces from the “warzone.” Withdrawing US “threats to Iran” would constitute a withdrawal from the region, presumably, which both removes US military leverage and accomplishes a key Iranian objective: expelling US forces from the region.

• Iran emphasized in its latest proposal that the Strait of Hormuz will remain under some form of Iranian control and that Iran will not continue negotiations if the United States does not end its blockade of Iranian ports and ships. Iranian officials continue to emphasize Iranian management of the strait as a key sticking point in negotiations.



• US President Donald Trump stated on May 23 that he would decide by May 24 whether to resume strikes on Iran. Trump said he would only accept a deal that addresses key issues, including Iran’s uranium enrichment and its HEU stockpile.

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